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FOUNDATIONS OF SAND: JUSTICE THOMAS’S CRITIQUE 
OF THE INDIAN PLENARY POWER DOCTRINE 
Taylor Ledford* 
I. Introduction 
The federal government of the United States is one of enumerated 
powers.1 There appears, however, to be a glaring exception to this rule 
when the federal government regulates Indians.2 In this area, Congress 
possesses “[p]lenary authority” over tribal affairs,3 an authority not drawn 
from the Constitution.4 Since the Supreme Court declared this power to be 
“a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department,”5 
Congress’s “schizophrenic”6 approach to Indian affairs has been premised 
upon the ability “to legislate for the Indian tribes in all matters.”7 
At the same time, the Supreme Court has continuously recognized that 
“the Indian tribes have not given up their full sovereignty.”8 Despite 
Congress passing legislation wholly altering tribal jurisdiction and 
governance,9 the Court has recognized that “[t]he sovereignty that the 
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character.”10 This sovereignty 
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by 
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”). 
 2. The terms “Native American,” “American Indian,” “Native,” and “Indian” are often 
used interchangeably to refer to the indigenous peoples of the United States. In this 
Comment, outside of quotations, I will favor the terms “Native American” or “Native” when 
referring to indigenous peoples more generally and the term “Indian” as it is most commonly 
used in federal law—that is, referring to members of federally recognized tribes. See, e.g., 25 
U.S.C. § 1903(3) (2012) (defining “Indian” for the purposes of the Indian Child Welfare 
Act). 
 3. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). 
 4. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–80 (1886). 
 5. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565. But see Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 
U.S. 73, 84–85 (1977) (holding that congressional action is within the grant of plenary 
power if it “can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation towards 
the Indians.” (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974))). 
 6. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 7. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978). 
 8. Id. at 323; see Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 9. See General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.); Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), ch. 576, 48 
Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended in 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5144).  
 10. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
168 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
 
 
comes not from some delegation by Congress but “existed prior to the 
Constitution.”11 It provides tribes jurisdiction “over both their members and 
their territory.”12 Paradoxically, this sovereignty is simultaneously inherent, 
yet, “subject to complete defeasance” by Congress.13 Like Congress’s 
plenary authority, tribes’ inherent sovereignty is not based upon any 
language present in the Constitution. Rather, the Court’s definition of 
tribes’ inherent sovereignty results from attempts by the Court to reconcile 
the position of the United States government as the heir to the colonization 
and conquest of North America14 with the fact that tribes remain distinct 
political entities exercising aspects of civil and criminal jurisdiction over 
their members.15 
The Court has analyzed both the plenary authority of Congress and the 
retained sovereignty of tribes in recent years, attempting to define the 
federal-tribal relationship for the twenty-first century. In Duro v. Reina, the 
Court addressed the question of whether inherent tribal sovereignty gives 
tribes jurisdiction over non-member Indians.16 Just twelve years earlier, in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court found that while tribes’ 
inherent sovereignty gave them jurisdiction over tribal members, they had 
no jurisdiction over non-Indians, even within the boundaries of their 
reservations.17 The Court in Duro, relying on Oliphant and Wheeler, held 
that inherent sovereignty no longer provided tribes with jurisdiction over 
Indians who were not members of that specific tribe, even on a tribe’s own 
land.18 
In response to the Court’s holding in Duro, Congress amended the Indian 
Civil Rights Act to recognize “the inherent power of Indian tribes . . . to 
                                                                                                                 
 11. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). 
 12. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 
(1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 15. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 329. 
 16. 495 U.S. 676, 679, 684–85 (1990). 
 17. 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978). 
 18. Duro, 495 U.S. at 691–92. One impact of the decision was that misdemeanors 
committed by one Indian in the Indian Country of another tribe became immediately un-
prosecutable. Aside from enumerated felonies listed at 18 U.S.C. § 1153, federal law 
explicitly disclaims jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against the persons or 
property of other Indians in Indian Country. 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (2012). 
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exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”19 In United States v. Lara, 
the Court examined whether Congress could use its plenary power to return 
elements of inherent tribal sovereignty previously ceded.20 The Court took 
this as an opportunity to shore up the text-wanting foundation of the plenary 
power doctrine, locating in the Indian Commerce Clause21 and the Treaty 
Clause22 the definitive textual source for congressional oversight of tribes.23 
Writing for the Court, Justice Stephen Breyer concluded that, to a certain 
extent, what Congress taketh away, it can giveth back.24 This interpretation 
gave tribes jurisdiction over all federally recognized Indians within Indian 
Country25 without implicating restrictions under the federal Bill of Rights.26 
The Court in Lara decided that the best path to resolve the tensions 
between inherent tribal sovereignty and Congress’s plenary authority was to 
pretend as though Congress’s authority was never extra-constitutional.27 
Justice Clarence Thomas suggested a different path.28 In his concurrence, 
Justice Thomas asserted that “the time has come to reexamine the premises 
and logic of our tribal sovereignty cases.”29 Specifically, he rejected the 
Court’s holding “that the Constitution grants to Congress plenary power to 
calibrate the ‘metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.’”30 Addressing each 
of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the majority in turn, Justice 
Thomas noted that the Kagama Court, which itself originated the plenary 
power doctrine, “consider[ed] [government reliance on] such a construction 
of the Indian Commerce Clause to be ‘very strained.’”31  
This Comment addresses Justice Thomas’s critique of the plenary power 
doctrine. It will first provide a background of the history and caselaw 
surrounding the doctrine. This background will track the drafting of the 
                                                                                                                 
 19. Pub. L. No. 101-511, 104 Stat. 1892 (1990) (the “Duro fix”) (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2)). 
 20. 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004). 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 23. Lara, 541 U.S. at 200.  
 24. Id. 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2012) (defining “Indian Country”). 
 26. Lara, 541 U.S. at 210; see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (holding 
that the Fifth Amendment, specifically its Grand Jury Clause, had no application in tribal 
courts and did not constrain tribal government). 
 27. Id. at 200. 
 28. Id. at 214 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 215 (quoting Lara, 541 U.S. at 202). 
 31. Id. at 224 (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1886)). 
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Indian Commerce Clause and the establishment of the “domestic dependent 
nations” concept. Then, it will address the historical context surrounding 
Kagama and Lone Wolf. Finally, it will explore congressional reliance on 
plenary power to justify Congress’s various policies that attempt to destroy 
or reinvigorate tribal governance over time and the limited standard of 
review the Supreme Court affords congressional action taken in accordance 
with the plenary power doctrine.  
Next, this Comment addresses Justice Thomas’s specific critiques of the 
plenary power doctrine. First, it will attempt to evaluate his short critique of 
reliance upon the treaty power in Lara. The Comment will then explore his 
detailed criticism of reliance on the Indian Commerce Clause to justify 
congressional action in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.32 Justice Thomas 
contends that the concepts of inherent tribal sovereignty and plenary power 
are on a collision course that will lead to either the total destruction or total 
vindication of tribal sovereignty.33 This Comment will provide the 
alternative views of Professor Gregory Ablavsky, who asserts that a version 
of plenary power effectively emanates from the penumbras of the 
Constitution.34 His initial premise, as well as the likelihood and effects of 
his proposed outcomes, will be evaluated. The Comment concludes that the 
total destruction of tribal sovereignty is the more likely result, but it is not 
desirable as a policy matter and is not constitutionally required.  
Finally, this Comment suggests an alternative analysis for determining 
congressional authority over tribes, beyond Congress’s enumerated powers, 
that stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Solem v. Bartlett.35 This 
approach would require a return to the treatymaking regime and the 
Executive duty of recognizing and negotiating with tribal governments, as 
any other foreign government, per the Constitution.36 The proper and 
constitutional solution for Congress is, as Justice Thomas urges, to “cease[] 
treating all Indian tribes as an undifferentiated mass” and instead recognize 
that each tribe did or does possess an individual sovereignty limited only to 
the extent voluntarily ceded by the individual tribe.37 Such a nuanced re-
thinking of dual sovereignty principles would be beneficial for tribal, 
federal, and even state governments. 
                                                                                                                 
 32. 570 U.S. 637 (2013). 
 33. Lara, 541 U.S. at 217–18. 
 34. Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1012 
(2015). 
 35. 465 U.S. 463 (1984). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 37. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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II. Background 
A. Natives at the Framing 
The word “Indian” appears only three times in the United States 
Constitution. In Section 2 of Article I and Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the word makes appearances only to exclude “Indians not 
taxed” from both congressional or tax apportionment, respectively.38 The 
word’s sole substantive mention is in the Commerce Clause, which gives 
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”39 This singular 
substantive appearance provides little insight into how the Framers intended 
their new government to interact with Indian tribes. Nor does the textual 
context indicate what the new republic’s citizens would have understood 
those words to mean.40 
The historical context before the drafting seems to support the notion 
that, as with so much of the Constitution, the inclusion of Indian tribes 
within the Commerce Clause was an attempt to remedy the problems 
inherent in the lack of any clear national-state delineation of jurisdiction 
under the Articles of Confederation.41 Under the Articles of Confederation, 
Congress confusingly possessed “the sole and exclusive right and power” of 
“regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians,” but only so 
long as they were “not members of any of the States; provided that the 
legislative right of any State, within its own limits, be not infringed or 
violated.”42 
The result under the Articles was that Congress had exclusive 
jurisdiction over Indians outside United States’ borders or within territories 
not yet organized into states. States possessed exclusive jurisdiction over 
“Member-Indians,” which included those who paid taxes to or were 
considered citizens of the state.43 State and national governments 
nevertheless effectively shared jurisdiction over non-member Indians 
                                                                                                                 
 38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 40. This is beyond, perhaps, that they intended to give Congress clear authority over all 
interstate or international commerce and wanted to leave nothing out. 
 41. See Robert G. Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce 
Clause, 85 DENVER U.L. REV. 201, 231–32 (2007). 
 42. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, cl. 4. James Madison himself 
considered these provisions “obscure and contradictory.” Natelson, supra note 41, at 234 
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 219 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001)). 
 43. Natelson, supra note 41, at 230.  
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within states, because although Congress had “the sole and exclusive right 
and power” to regulate affairs of non-member Indians, it could not do so in 
any way that “infringed or violated” the legislative right of any state.44 
Thus, state legislation could pre-empt national policy. This led to jostling 
between state and national governments over which level of government 
should manage Indian policy.45 Attempts to narrowly interpret the language 
were undermined by the provision’s broad charge and clear drafting history, 
which rejected narrower language.46 
At the Constitutional Convention, the question of Indian affairs initially 
flew below the radar. During its first two months, the Convention left 
undecided provisions concerning Indian affairs.47 While the Committee of 
Detail, charged with drafting the new Constitution, had been presented with 
a plan granting to Congress the “exclusive Power of regulating Indian 
Affairs,”48 the first draft the Committee brought to the Convention 
contained no provision addressing Indian affairs or commerce.49 After 
James Madison suggested an Indian affairs clause containing no exclusivity 
language, the Committee returned with language that both narrowed 
congressional authority over Indian affairs to “commerce . . . with Indians, 
within the [l]imits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof”50 and 
followed Madison’s suggestion of using no exclusivity language.51 The 
narrowing of the subject matter from “affairs” to “commerce” would have 
“den[ied] Congress competence over diplomacy, boundary adjustment, and 
other forms of intercourse, all of which would [have been] handled by 
treaty instead.”52 The removal of the exclusivity language would have 
effectively granted states exclusive jurisdiction over any Indians that they 
could subject to their laws,53 while the Treaty Clause would give the federal 
government the ability to referee disputes between states and tribes.54 
                                                                                                                 
 44. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IX, cl. 4. 
 45. Natelson, supra note 41, at 235. 
 46. Id. at 234. 
 47. Id. at 235. 
 48. Id. at 236 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 158–
59 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (Committee of Detail)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 237 (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 
48, at 367 (Madison’s Journal) (Aug. 22, 1787)). 
 51. Id. at 237–38. 
 52. Id. at 238. 
 53. Id. 
 54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (forbidding states from “enter[ing] into any Treaty”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/5
No. 1] COMMENTS 173 
 
 
The final draft of the Commerce Clause produced a minimalist 
compromise on the Indian question.55 By placing Congress’s grant over 
Indian affairs within the Commerce Clause and limiting its language to five 
words,56 the final Indian Commerce Clause avoided much of the confusion 
that arose under the Articles of Confederation. First, with the removal of the 
exclusivity provision, a presumption of state jurisdiction absent affirmative 
congressional action replaced the impetus for litigation about where 
exclusivity began or ended.57 Similarly, the removal of language limiting 
congressional authority to specific classes removed the incentive for 
gamesmanship by states to maximize the number of Indians outside federal 
authority (and therefore limit the ability of the federal government to 
intervene in what might be considered state affairs).58 This culminated in 
the view that “states would enjoy concurrent, although subordinate, 
jurisdiction with Congress over Indian commerce.”59 If there was any doubt 
about the result of conflict between state and federal law, the Supremacy 
Clause erased it.60 
The new Constitution appeared to create a government of limited 
powers, even towards Indians, by limiting Congress’s purview “[t]o 
regulate commerce with . . . Indian tribes.”61 The document reserved more 
substantive government power to action by treaty, which required alliance 
between the Executive and Legislative branches,62 while prohibiting such 
action by the states.63 
B. The Marshall Trilogy and the Ward-Guardian Relationship 
When the Kagama and Lone Wolf Courts pointed to authorities for the 
plenary power doctrine, they did not point to provisions of the Constitution, 
but instead to Marshall Court decisions.64 Laid out over nine years, the 
aptly-named Marshall Trilogy consists of Johnson v. M’Intosh, Cherokee 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Natelson, supra note 41, at 238. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 238–39. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 61. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 64. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564–65 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 
118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886). 
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Nation v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia.65 The trilogy is, among other 
things, largely a testament to the ability of the Marshall Court to create just 
as many problems as it solved.66 
That Johnson itself became the first federal Indian law case was almost 
accidental. In Johnson, the question presented to the Court was limited in 
scope, addressing only whether a private purchase of Indian land, made in 
violation of the Proclamation of 1763, would have been recognized in 
British courts in 1773.67 Further, if so, would United States courts be bound 
to recognize it in 1823?68 Chief Justice Marshall, seeking to validate land 
claims Virginia awarded its militia veterans,69 expanded and flipped the 
question so the Court could rule definitively on who could purchase Indian 
lands.70 By lifting his historical analysis of discovery and conquest from his 
own critically-panned biography of George Washington71 and tailoring his 
legal analysis to his desired outcome, Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed the 
discovery doctrine.72 Under this doctrine, when European powers 
‘discovered’ territory in the new world, fee simple title to the land 
immediately vested in the discovering sovereign.73 Indian tribes retained 
solely an occupancy right, which could only be relinquished to the 
discovering sovereign or its successor in interest.74 
Eight years later, when Cherokee Nation advocates confronted the Court 
with the results of Johnson, the Court opted not to directly address the 
question of what authority states possess over Indians within their borders.75 
The advocates in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, having brought their suit 
under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction,76 should be forgiven for 
believing that they had forced the issue.77 Instead, the Marshall Court held 
                                                                                                                 
 65. See generally Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  
 66. See generally Alex Tallchief Skibine, Chief Justice John Marshall and the Doctrine 
of Discovery: Friend or Foe to the Indians?, 42 TULSA L. REV. 125 (2006). 
 67. LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 96–97 (2005). 
 68. Id. at 96. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 591–93.  
 71. ROBERTSON, supra note 67, at 101–02. 
 72. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 572–73. 
 73. Id. at 572–74. 
 74. Id.  
 75. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831). 
 76. Id. at 15–16. 
 77. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (defining the original jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of the United States). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss1/5
No. 1] COMMENTS 175 
 
 
that because Cherokee Nation was neither a foreign nation nor a state of the 
United States, the Court had no authority to hear the case under its original 
jurisdiction.78 Rather, the Court noted that the status of Indian nations 
within the United States is one of a “domestic dependent nation[],” a 
relationship that “resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”79  
The Cherokee Nation Court’s explanation of this ward-guardian 
relationship contains some of the most paternalistic language in Supreme 
Court Indian caselaw. Under this relationship, Indian tribes turn to the 
federal government “for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; 
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great 
father.”80 At the same time, the Court in Cherokee Nation began to 
recognize the founding tenants81 of what would later be defined as “inherent 
tribal sovereignty.”82 The Court recognized that Indian tribes, or at very 
least the Cherokee, are “distinct political societ[ies], separated from others, 
capable of managing [their] own affairs and governing [themselves].”83 
Indeed, the Court noted that the Cherokee, in particular, “have been 
uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country.”84 
The Court’s avoidance of this issue did not last. In Worcester v. Georgia 
just one year later, Chief Justice Marshall got the chance to fix the problems 
created in Johnson without the procedural pitfalls of Cherokee Nation.85 In 
Worcester, a white non-Indian living within Cherokee Nation territory was 
arrested, tried, and convicted by the State of Georgia for the high crime of 
“‘residing within the limits of the Cherokee nation without a license,’ and 
‘without having taken the oath to support and defend the constitution and 
laws of the [S]tate of Georgia.’”86 Marshall used Worcester to attempt to 
undo as much of Johnson as possible without explicitly overturning it. 
Chief Justice Marshall began Worcester by providing an alternative 
account of discovery and colonization from the one he proffered in 
Johnson, premising the new account on “the actual state of things.”87 This 
alternative history, while not explicitly rejecting the discovery doctrine 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 20. 
 79. Id. at 17. 
 80. Id. This is especially ironic given that Andrew Jackson was President in 1831. 
 81. Id. at 16. 
 82. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). 
 83. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 16. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 86. Id. at 543. 
 87. Id. at 542–44. 
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wholesale, attempts to reformulate the concept from the Court’s declaration 
in Johnson that Indian tribes’ “power to dispose of the soil at their own 
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental 
principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.”88 
Instead, the history in Worcester pointed to a conclusion that discovery 
“gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not found that right on a 
denial of the right of the possessor to sell.”89 The Court based this 
seemingly opposite conclusion on its conceptualization of discovery as a 
contractual arrangement among European powers, one that did not directly 
implicate the rights of tribes.90 
The Court concluded in Worcester by detailing, for the first time, the 
nature of tribal sovereignty,91 expanding upon the foundations laid down in 
Cherokee Nation92 and holding that the laws of the State of Georgia “can 
have no force” within the boundaries of the Cherokee Nation.93 This 
affirmed Cherokee Nation’s inherent authority to exclude any non-
members, except to the extent required by treaties or federal statute.94 “The 
Indian nations,” the Court declared, “had always been considered as 
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time immemorial.”95 
As long as this “full right to the land[] they occupied” had not been 
extinguished by the federal government acting with tribal consent, “within 
[tribal] boundary, they possessed rights with which no state could 
interfere.”96 
  
                                                                                                                 
 88. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
 89. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544. 
 90. Id. (“[Discovery] was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition 
among those [European nations] who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the 
previous rights of those who had not agreed to it.”). Chief Justice Marshall even went so far 
as to declare that “[t]he extravagant and absurd idea, that the feeble [British] settlements 
made on the sea coast, or the companies under whom they were made, acquired legitimate 
power by them to govern the people, or occupy the lands from sea to sea, did not enter the 
mind of any man.” Id. at 544–45 (emphasis added). This seems a far cry from Johnson’s 
summation “that discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.” 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 
574. 
 91. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559. 
 92. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16–17 (1831). 
 93. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 559. 
 96. Id. at 560. 
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C. United States v. Kagama and the Advent of Plenary Power 
In order to understand the historical circumstances surrounding the 
Court’s discovery of extra-constitutional power in Kagama,97 it is crucial to 
address the Court’s decision in Ex parte Crow Dog98 and the Major Crimes 
Act of 1885.99 In Crow Dog, a federal jury in the Dakota Territory 
convicted Crow Dog, a Sioux Nation tribal member, for the murder of 
Spotted Tail, another Sioux Nation tribal member.100 While the murder 
occurred squarely within the outer boundaries of the Dakota Territory, it 
also plainly occurred within Indian Country.101 Thus, Crow Dog appealed 
his conviction on the grounds that federal criminal jurisdiction did not 
extend to crimes committed by Indians against Indians of the same tribe 
occurring within Indian Country.102 The Supreme Court agreed, holding 
that while federal criminal jurisdiction had been extended to certain classes 
of crimes committed within Sioux Nation under an 1868 treaty, the 
language of the treaty did not cover Indian-on-Indian crimes occurring 
therein.103 The Court noted that to hold otherwise, in the absence of clear 
congressional intent, would “impose upon [Indians] the restraints of an 
external and unknown code . . . according to rules and penalties of which 
they could have no previous warning.”104 
In 1885, Congress responded to Crow Dog by passing the Major Crimes 
Act (MCA).105 The MCA expressly extended concurrent federal criminal 
jurisdiction to an enumerated list of crimes occurring in Indian Country so 
long as the crime was committed by a tribal member.106 Between 1883 and 
1885, no new treaties were signed with Sioux Nation.107 Therefore, because 
the Crow Dog Court already held that the 1868 treaty did not extend to 
Indian-on-Indian crimes occurring in Indian Country,108 the question the 
Court would have to address in United States v. Kagama was: Under what 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See generally United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 
 98. See generally 109 U.S. 556 (1883). 
 99. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012 & Supp. I 2013) (originally enacted as Act of 
Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385). 
 100. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 571–72. 
 104. Id. at 571. 
 105. See Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (Major Crimes Act) 
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 567–68. 
 108. Id. 
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provision of the United States Constitution is Congress empowered to 
regulate the internal criminal affairs of tribes?109 
The proper test case appeared the next year when two Indians, 
Mahawaha and Kagama, were charged with the murder of another Indian, 
Iyouse, within the Hoopa Valley Reservation in California.110 In Kagama, 
the Court reviewed essentially two questions certified to it: 1) was the MCA 
within the constitutional power of Congress to pass; and if it was, 2) did 
federal courts have jurisdiction to try Indian-on-Indian crimes occurring 
within a reservation?111 The Court quickly dispensed with the second 
question because, unlike in Crow Dog, the MCA clearly placed enumerated 
Indian-on-Indian offenses occurring in Indian Country within federal 
jurisdiction, regardless of whether it occurred on or off reservation.112  
The United States government presented two sources of congressional 
authority for the passage of the MCA: 1) the Indian Commerce Clause, and 
2) the treaty power.113 The Court rejected both arguments.114 First, it held 
that it would be “a very strained construction” of the Indian Commerce 
Clause that would empower Congress to create “a system of criminal laws” 
within an act that did not contain even a tangential reference to 
commerce.115 Likewise, the Court rejected the notion that Indian tribes fell 
within Congress’s grant of authority over affairs with foreign nations.116 If 
Indian tribes were foreign nations, the Court reasoned, there would have 
been no reason to include them within the Commerce Clause at all, as it 
already explicitly covered foreign nations.117 The Court went even further, 
holding that Indian tribes were not “nations” within the meaning of the 
                                                                                                                 
 109. 118 U.S. 375, 376 (1886). 
 110. Id. The procedural posture of Kagama proves it was a test case; the Court heard the 
case based solely upon a demurrer to the evidence prior to any actual conviction. Id. at 375. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s factual accounting does little justice to that actual story, 
failing to identify, among other things, the tribe to which the parties belonged (Yurok), and 
that Kagama and Mahawaha were father and son. For a fuller accounting of the background, 
see Sindey L. Herring, The Story of United States v. Kagama, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 149, 
152–53 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin K. Washburn, & Philip P. Frickey eds., 2011). 
 111. Id. at 376. 
 112. Id. at 377–78. 
 113. Id. at 378–79. 
 114. Id. at 378–80. 
 115. Id. at 378. 
 116. Id. at 378–79. 
 117. Id. at 379. 
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Constitution. The word “nation,” despite numerous appearances throughout 
the Constitution, does not ever appear to reference Indian tribes.118  
Despite finding no words in the Constitution to support the government’s 
assertion of congressional authority, the Court ultimately found the MCA to 
be a valid exercise of federal power that “must exist in that government, 
because it never has existed anywhere else.”119 The Court began by drawing 
an analogy between the state of Indian tribes and federal territories, 
divorcing the source of federal power to make and enforce laws in its 
territories120 from the words of the Constitution that would seem to provide 
such authority.121 Instead, the Court reasoned that “this power of 
Congress . . . arises, not so much from the clause in the Constitution[,] . . . 
as from . . . the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the 
National Government, and can be found nowhere else.”122 
The Court held that, due to the unique status of Indian tribes, general 
criminal laws must be “within the competency of Congress.”123 As “wards 
of the nation,” Indian tribes “depend[] on the United States . . . for their 
daily food . . . [and] political rights.”124 Since the course of dealing with the 
federal government had left Indian tribes weak and helpless, the federal 
government had assumed a “duty of protection, and with it the power.”125 
This power “over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and 
diminished in numbers” exists for “their protection, as well as to the safety 
of those among whom they dwell.”126 In order to protect Indian tribes from 
states whose people “are often their deadliest enemies,” the Court held that 
this power must exist in the federal government.127 Therefore, the Major 
Crimes Act was a valid exercise of that power.128 
  
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. (“Were they nations, in the minds of the framers of the Constitution? If so, the 
natural phrase would have been ‘foreign nations and Indian nations,’ or . . . it would 
naturally have been ‘foreign and Indian nations.’”).  
 119. Id. at 384. 
 120. Id. at 380. 
 121. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging 
to the United States.”). 
 122. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 380. 
 123. Id. at 383. 
 124. Id. at 383–84. 
 125. Id. at 384. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 385. 
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D. Lone Wolf and the Exercise of Pax-Plenary Power 
1. Allotment Era 
While it was clear after Kagama that Congress could assert complete 
criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country, the Court did not describe the full 
extent of that power until 1903.129 In the immediate aftermath of Kagama, 
Congress flexed its newly text-liberated power over Indian affairs through 
the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887 (also known as the 
Dawes Act).130 The Dawes Act represented a titanic policy shift from one 
that favored effective segregation by reservation to one that favored 
assimilation through the allotment of reservation land.131 Under the Dawes 
Act, the President was authorized to divide up reservation land and grant a 
fixed sum of land (an allotment) to each tribal member.132 The allotment 
land itself would be selected by the recipient or his guardian (or the 
Secretary of the Interior if no selection was made within four years) and 
would be held in trust for the sole use and benefit of the individual allottee 
for twenty-five years.133 After this period, the allottee, now presumably 
“assimilate[d] to agriculture, to Christianity, and to citizenship,” would 
receive a patent in fee simple for the land and would become subject to 
state civil and criminal jurisdiction.134 
For this assimilation plan to actually work, Congress reasoned, there 
must be a dominant culture on hand into which the newly individualized 
Indians could assimilate.135 The Dawes Act served this function by 
providing for the opening of the “surplus” lands for non-Indian settlement, 
at the President’s discretion, after all allotments had been assigned.136 
Unlike allotment itself, the opening of surplus lands would seem to require 
tribal consent under the Act.137 Section 5 of the Dawes Act instructed the 
“Secretary of the Interior to negotiate with such Indian tribe for the 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903). 
 130. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 2000). 
 131. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 9 (1995). 
 132. Dawes Act § 1, 24 Stat. at 388. Initially the statute provided different sums based 
upon the status of a tribal member. See id. By 1891, however, the statute had been amended 
to provide an equally sized allotment to each tribal member. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, 
§ 1, 26 Stat. 794, 794; see also Royster, supra note 131, at 10 n.34 (summarizing 
congressional changes to standard allotment sizes between 1887 and 1910). 
 133. Dawes Act §§ 2, 5, 24 Stat. at 388, 389–90. 
 134. Royster, supra note 131, at 10; Dawes Act § 6, 24 Stat. at 390. 
 135. Royster, supra note 131, at 13. 
 136. Dawes Act § 5, 24 Stat. 389–90. 
 137. Id. 
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purchase and release . . . of such portions of its reservation not allotted as 
such tribe shall, from time to time, consent to sell.”138 Even if tribes and 
commissioners agreed to the contents of an agreement, the agreement still 
required passage of a congressional act to become binding.139 While some 
agreements were successfully negotiated, many tribes refused to sell or 
asked too high a price.140 It is against this backdrop that the Supreme Court 
decided what has since been called the Dred Scott v. Sandford141 of Indian 
law: Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.142  
2. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock 
In 1892, at the height of allotment, commissioners representing the 
United States were sent to negotiate the allotment of a reservation 
belonging jointly to the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache tribes.143 In 
ostensible compliance with the “Medicine Lodge Treaty,” which required 
the signatures of three-fourths of all adult male tribal members before 
cession of any part of the reservation, the commissioners collected the 
signatures of 456 adult male Indians.144 The Indian Agent certified that 
there were only 562 adult male Indians within the three tribes, placing the 
number of signatures squarely above the three-fourths requirement.145 
Under the agreement, the tribes would surrender their land rights to the 
United States.146 The federal government would then allot the standard 
amount of land to individual Indians to be held in trust by the United States 
and taken in fee simple by the allottee or their heirs after twenty-five years. 
In accordance with the agreement, the tribes would receive $2,000,000 as 
consideration for the 2,150,000 acres of arable surplus land.147 Specially 
provided for were the “sundry named friends of the Indians,” which 
included the Indian Agent and an Army officer, who received land benefits 
as if they were members of the tribe.148 
                                                                                                                 
 138. Id. (emphasis added). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Royster, supra note 131, at 13. 
 141. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 142. Joseph William Singer, Lone Wolf, or How to Take Property by Calling It a “Mere 
Change in the Form of Investment,” 38 TULSA L. REV. 37, 37 (2002). 
 143. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 554–55 (1903). 
 144. Id. at 554. 
 145. Id. at 554–55. 
 146. Id. at 555. 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. 
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As it happened, the Indian Agent’s count of total adult male Indians was 
incorrect.149 After the agreement was submitted to Congress, representatives 
of the tribes immediately objected that the commissioners obtained the 
signatures as a result of their interpreters’ fraudulent misrepresentations and 
that three-fourths of the adult male members had not signed.150 While the 
House of Representatives passed the bill without comment, the Senate 
requested that the Secretary of the Interior certify that the signatures 
attached to the agreement constituted three-fourths of the male adult tribal 
membership when the agreement was signed.151 The Secretary reported that 
no 1892 census records existed, but 1893 records indicated that there were 
725 men over the age of eighteen, with 639 over the age of twenty-one.152 
Under either measure, the Secretary admitted, “less than three fourths of the 
male adults appear[ed] to have so signed.”153 
Congress amended the agreement to provide 480,000 acres of grazing 
land to be held in common by the tribes and eliminated the special benefits 
for the Indian Agent and Army officer.154 Nevertheless, the tribes’ 
representatives did not consent, and on June 6, 1900, Congress passed the 
bulk of the agreement over their objections and without any further attempt 
to gather signatures.155 Shortly thereafter, Lone Wolf, Principal Chief of the 
Kiowa Tribe, brought suit, alleging a violation of the Medicine Lodge 
Treaty, among other improprieties in the agreement process.156 The 
Supreme Court granted review to determine whether Congress acted 
improperly by failing to gather the signatures of three-fourths of the adult 
male tribal members in violation of the Medicine Lodge Treaty.157 The 
Court held that it had not.158 
The Court took this opportunity to declare that not only was 
congressional authority over Indian affairs extra-constitutional, but that it 
                                                                                                                 
 149. Id. at 557. 
 150. Id. at 556. 
 151. Id. at 557. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 154. Id. at 559–60. 
 155. Id. at 559–61. Congress passed additional amendments shortly thereafter to extend 
the time for allotting the land and to facilitate the opening of surplus land for white 
settlement, likewise without any attempt to comply with the Medicine Lodge Treaty. Id. at 
560–61. 
 156. Id. at 560–61, 564. 
 157. Id. at 564. 
 158. Id. 
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was plenary in nature.159 This power, the Court explained, had “always 
been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial 
department of the government.”160 The Court offered three justifications for 
its expansive view of this power. First, the Court noted the status of Indian 
tribes and their “relation of dependency.”161 Second, the Court reasoned that 
plenary authority is necessary, at least in the context of land, due to the 
United States’ ownership of the underlying title.162 Third, the Court argued 
that the federal government is the proper entity to trust with this sort of 
authority.163 
The status of Indian tribes is crucial, the Court stated, because allowing 
the Medicine Lodge Treaty to limit the authority of Congress would have 
fundamentally altered the relationship between tribes and the federal 
government.164 Congress could not fully care for and protect Indian tribes if 
it could not quickly, and without tribal assent, “partition and dispos[e] of” 
Indian lands.165 As Indian tribes remain dependent on the federal 
government, the Court contended, the government’s unencumbered ability 
to protect them remains paramount.166 In order to quickly respond to any 
possible emergency, the Court concluded that Congress needed the ability 
to unilaterally abrogate treaties.167 
Next, the Court turned to the nature of the lands at issue and the federal 
government’s relationship to them.168 The Court first distinguished prior 
caselaw that seemed to place the territorial integrity of Indian tribes’ 
reservations in a place of special concern.169 The Court cited to Johnson, 
Cherokee Nation, and Worcester, characterizing them as standing for the 
proposition that the Indian right of occupancy might be “as sacred as the fee 
of the United States in the same lands.”170 These cases are inapplicable, the 
Court said, because they involved a dispute between either an Indian tribe 
and a state or an individual, not a dispute between the federal government 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. at 565. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 564. 
 162. Id. at 565. 
 163. Id. at 565–66. 
 164. Id. at 564. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 564–65. 
 167. Id. at 564. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 564–65. 
 170. Id. 
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and a tribe.171 The Court made clear that when an Indian tribe’s interest in 
occupancy is measured directly against the United States’ interest in the 
underlying fee, the interest of the United States is greater.172 This interest, 
which Congress may transfer at any time, brings with it “a paramount 
power over the property of the Indians, by reason of [the United States’] 
exercise of guardianship.”173 This authority, the Court held, may “be 
implied, even though opposed to the strict letter of a treaty with the 
Indians.”174 
Finally, the Court contended that the very nature of this extra-
constitutional power makes judicial review unnecessary and imbues a per se 
presumption of good faith on congressional action.175 The Court asserted, 
without providing any sources or examples, that this “[p]lenary authority 
over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from 
the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not 
subject to be controlled by the judicial department.”176 The Court doubled 
down on some of its prior rhetoric from Beecher v. Wetherby,177 holding 
that when Congress exercises this power, “[i]t is to be presumed that in this 
matter the United States would be governed by such considerations of 
justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment of an ignorant 
and dependent race.”178 This presumption is proper, according to the Court, 
because even before Congress ended the practice of dealing with Indian 
tribes through treaties in 1871, “a moral obligation rested upon Congress to 
act in good faith in performing the stipulations entered into on its behalf.”179 
The Court created no outer limit to this new congressional power to 
abrogate provisions of treaties with Indians but instead merely expressed a 
hope that “such power will be exercised only when circumstances arise 
which . . . may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians 
themselves, that it should do so.”180 The Court concluded, however, by 
unequivocally indicating that it would not enforce this hope, but would 
“presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the dealings with the 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 565–66. 
 173. Id. at 565. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 566. 
 176. Id. at 565. 
 177. 95 U.S. 517 (1877). 
 178. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565 (quoting Beecher, 95 U.S. at 525) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 179. Id. at 565–66. 
 180. Id. at 566. 
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Indians.”181 If tribes wished to call foul on congressional action, the Court 
mandated that “relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress, 
and not to the courts.”182 Taking the position that “the judiciary cannot 
question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment of this 
legislation,” the Court held that the June 6, 1900, Act and its subsequent, 
related acts were constitutionally valid.183 To the extent they conflicted with 
provisions of the Medicine Lodge Treaty, they abrogated those portions of 
the Treaty.184 
3. After Lone Wolf 
In the years after Lone Wolf, Congress’s allotment policy kicked into 
high gear. From the passage of the General Allotment Act of 1887 to 1900, 
Congress created only “55,996 allotments, covering 6,736,504 acres”; by 
1910, there were “190,401 allotments[,] covering 31,093,647 acres.”185 
Whereas tribal consent appeared important, if not vital, before Lone Wolf, 
all pretense was dropped with the judicial declaration of plenary power. For 
example, when Commissioner of Indian Affairs William A. Jones testified 
before the House Committee on Indian Affairs in 1904 concerning the 
setting of a per-acre purchase price for surplus lands on the Rosebud 
Reservation, he emphatically urged the Committee to act without seeking 
tribal consent.186 Jones made the ward-guardian analogy literal, comparing 
the Native residents of the Rosebud Reservation to “child[ren] [of] 8 or 10 
years of age.”187 Jones asked rhetorically if the Committee would “ask the 
consent of [a] child as to the investment of its fund?”188 Over the protest of 
Indian advocates, Congress passed the measure without consultation with, 
let alone the consent of, the tribes.189 The Committee’s only justification for 
                                                                                                                 
 181. Id. at 568. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. The comparisons to Dred Scott began almost immediately. See, e.g., 36 CONG. 
REC. 2028 (1903) (statement of Sen. Matthew Quay) (“It is the Dredd Scott decision No. 2, 
except that in this case the victim is red instead of black. It practically inculcates the doctrine 
that the red man has no rights which the white man is bound to respect, and that no treaty or 
contract made with him is bind. Is not that about it?”). 
 185. 2 FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 865 (1984). 
 186. Id. at 868. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  
 189. Id. at 869. 
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altering the course of its dealing was the one offered to it by the Court: 
whenever Congress acted, it did so in the best interests of the Indians.190 
This pattern of congressional action without any serious tribal 
consultation or consent, justified as being in the tribe’s best interest, 
continued.191 Congressional acts concerning tribal lands “were proposed by 
western politicians, approved by a voice vote in Congress, and greeted with 
cheers from local settlers and businessmen.”192 During this time, the federal 
government attempted to regulate nearly every aspect of life on Indian 
reservations in a continuing attempt to Christianize and civilize.193 
For example, the Office of Indian Affairs regulated not only liquor 
consumption on reservations, but also intimately regulated tribal religious 
ceremonies, carefully monitoring dances that may involve “acts of self-
torture, immoral relations between the sexes, the sacrificial destruction of 
clothing or other useful articles, the reckless giving away of property, the 
use of injurious drugs or intoxicants, and frequent or prolonged periods of 
celebration.”194 Traditional Native religious or cultural ceremonies that 
involved these practices were classified as “[I]ndian offenses” and 
prohibited by law.195  
When current Supreme Court precedent would seem to limit the 
population within the federal government’s jurisdiction, the Court changed 
the law. The Pueblos of New Mexico and Arizona, for example, had long 
been considered legally distinct from Native communities elsewhere in the 
United States by virtue of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo under which the 
United States acquired the territory.196 The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
guaranteed that those who suddenly found themselves residents of the 
United States due to the Treaty could “retain[] the property which they 
[had] possess[ed] in the said territories,” or, if they wished, sell their 
property and expatriate the profits unencumbered.197 Under the laws of 
Mexico, and Spain before it, Pueblo Indians retained fee title to their lands, 
                                                                                                                 
 190. Id. 
 191. Royster, supra note 131, at 14. 
 192. Id. (quoting FREDERICK E. HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE 
THE INDIANS, 1880–1920, at 165 (1984)). 
 193. PRUCHA, supra note 185, at 764–66. 
 194. Id. at 801 (quoting Office of Indian Affairs Circular no. 1665 (Apr. 26, 1921) 
(M1121, reel 12)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 195. Id.  
 196. United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 618 (1876). 
 197. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico, 
Mex.-U.S., art. 8, July 4, 1848, 9 Stat. 922. 
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not “Indian title” in the spirit of Johnson.198 As a result, Pueblo title was as 
freely alienable as land owned by non-Indians in the United States.199 
More than that, Pueblo were not initially considered “Indians” in the 
legal sense.200 Noting the cultural differences between Pueblo Indians and 
Native peoples elsewhere within the United States, as well as their more 
assimilated status (having adopted both the Spanish language and 
Catholicism), the Court held in United States v. Joseph that Pueblo Indians 
were “Indians only in feature, complexion, and a few of their habits; in all 
other respects superior to all but a few of the civilized Indian tribes of the 
country, and the equal of the most civilized.”201 Thus, the Court reasoned, 
Pueblos were neither Indians in the traditional sense, nor were they 
intended to be covered by the use of the term in the relevant 1834 statute.202  
When Congress attempted to exercise its plenary power to prohibit the 
introduction of alcohol to Pueblos, it appeared that things had changed.203 
In United States v. Sandoval, the Court reviewed the legality of a criminal 
prosecution for selling liquor to the Santa Clara Pueblo.204 Federal law 
prohibited the introduction of liquor and other intoxicating beverages to 
Indian Country.205 New Mexico’s Enabling Act mirrored the federal 
prohibition and deemed Pueblo lands to be Indian Country within the 
meaning of federal law.206 The question for the Court, then, was “whether 
the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands” placed them within the 
scope of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs.207 Based upon 
reports from Indian agents, the Supreme Court determined that due to the 
Pueblo’s “degraded condition” and subsequent acts of Congress regulating 
them, Pueblos were now ‘Indians’ that Congress had plenary power to 
regulate.208 
  
                                                                                                                 
 198. Joseph, 94 U.S. at 618. 
 199. Id. at 618–19; see also United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 48 (1913). 
 200. Joseph, 94 U.S. at 617–18. 
 201. Id. at 616–17. 
 202. Id. at 617. 
 203. Sandoval, 231 U.S. at 38–39. 
 204. Id. at 36. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 36–37. 
 207. Id. at 38. Interestingly enough, the Court held that New Mexico’s statehood act did 
not resolve the question, because although Congress may determine whether tribal groups 
are “distinctly Indian communities,” it may not arbitrarily determine if they are racially 
“Indian.” Id. at 46. 
 208. Id. at 45, 46–48. 
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4. The Indian Reorganization Act 
Part of the attractiveness of plenary power is that when in the proper 
hands, its exercise is capable of accomplishing just as much good as ill. For 
example, in the aftermath of the Meriam Report’s scathing review of the 
Allotment Era Office of Indian Affairs,209 with new leadership in the 
Interior Department and the New Deal Congress in full swing, Congress 
passed the Indian Reorganization Act (the IRA).210 The sweeping 
legislation officially ended the policy of allotment, prohibiting further 
allotments, extending trust periods on allotted land with existing Indian title 
indefinitely, maintaining restrictions on the alienability of Indian lands, 
barring the transfer of restricted lands except to tribes, and limiting their 
ability to be devised.211 The IRA allowed tribes to organize and adopt 
constitutions to further self-government and permitted tribes to incorporate 
for the purpose of business endeavors.212 The IRA allowed tribes to devise 
their own constitutions while also providing a model constitution tribes 
could adopt.213 Although officially most of its provisions were optional to 
tribes, there was an opt-out process for the IRA that required tribes to 
affirmatively opt-out by a majority vote of the tribe’s members.214 
The IRA went much further than simply attempting to right prior wrongs 
through reinstating meaningful tribal self-government; it also sought to 
restore tribal control over land long since removed through allotment.215 In 
particular, section 5 of the IRA authorized the Secretary of the Interior to 
take land into trust for the benefit of tribes, “restore remaining surplus lands 
to tribes,” create new reservation lands, or extend existing ones.216 This 
effectively allowed the Secretary to unilaterally grant tribal sovereignty 
over any lands within the United States, taking what before 1871 required a 
treaty signed by the President and agreed upon by two-thirds of the United 
States Senate, and turning it into a purely administrative function. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 209. PRUCHA, supra note 185, at 810 (the report found “deplorable conditions in health, 
education, and economic welfare and found incompetent and inefficient personnel”). 
 210. Id. at 957–63. 
 211. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.05 at 82 (Neil Jessup Newton et 
al. eds., 2012). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. at 83 n.16. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 82. 
 216. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 5108 (2012). 
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E. Review of Congressional Action 
Although the Supreme Court stated in Lone Wolf that Congress’s Indian 
power was “a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial 
department,”217 the Court has since backed away from a total bar on judicial 
review. Beginning in United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, a plurality 
of the Court explicitly recognized that “[t]he power of Congress over Indian 
affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it is not absolute.”218 There, although 
the Court did not invalidate congressional action per se, it rejected the 
federal government’s interpretation of the Act of 1935.219 The government’s 
interpretation would have allowed it to legitimize its prior taking of tribal 
lands “without rendering, or assuming an obligation to render, just 
compensation for them,” in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause.220 
Likewise, in Morton v. Mancari, the Court reviewed a challenge to the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ preferential hiring policy (under provisions of the 
IRA) towards tribal members on the grounds that it constituted racial 
discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.221 Even as the Court acknowledged that the challenger’s 
theory would effectively eliminate federal Indian policy, it did not reject the 
challenge out of hand.222 Instead, the Court went on to seriously consider 
the claims presented, ultimately deciding that the classification itself was 
not a racial preference at all, but a political one that turned on whether the 
applicant was a member of a federally recognized tribe.223 
The only Supreme Court case to squarely address, in the modern context, 
the standard of review for whether Indian affairs related legislation properly 
falls within Congress’s ambit occurred a few years later in Delaware Tribal 
                                                                                                                 
 217. 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903). 
 218. 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946) (plurality opinion). 
 219. Id.; see also Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 686, 49 Stat. 801, 801–02 (giving the United 
States Court of Claims jurisdiction to hear claims of certain tribes residing in Oregon). 
 220. Alcea Band, 329 U.S. at 54 (quoting United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 
110 (1935) (internal quotations omitted)). 
 221. 417 U.S. 535, 537 (1974). 
 222. Id. at 552 (“If these laws, derived from historical relationships and explicitly 
designed to help only Indians, were deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of 
the United States Code (25 U.S.C.) would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment 
of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”). 
 223. Id. at 553–54. It might be noted that the BIA’s policy also required applicants “be 
one-fourth or more degree Indian blood,” a facet of the policy the Court did not address 
directly. Id. at 553 n.24 (quoting 44 BIAM 335, 3.1). 
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Business Committee v. Weeks.224 There, the Court reviewed a challenge to 
the federal government’s award distribution scheme following an Indian 
Claims Commission decision to compensate for a breach of an 1854 treaty 
with the Delaware Tribe.225 In Weeks, the government argued that 
“congressional exercise of control over tribal property is final and not 
subject to judicial scrutiny.”226 The Court, citing Alcea Band and Mancari, 
rejected the notion of a categorical bar on review.227 Instead, the Court held 
that review was proper but limited the standard to whether “the special 
treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’[s] unique 
obligation toward the Indians.”228 Under this permissive standard of review, 
the Court upheld Congress’s choice to exclude the Kansas Delaware from 
the award because they had split off from the main Delaware Tribe and 
accepted United States citizenship—even though they did so after the 
breach of the treaty.229 
Even on the sparing occasions when the Court has struck down Indian 
affairs related legislation, it has not done so because it was an improper use 
of plenary power, but rather because it violated some other constitutional 
provision. For example, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court 
invalidated a portion of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, which 
abrogated state sovereign immunity in order to enforce a good-faith 
negotiating duty with tribes.230 It did not invalidate the provision because its 
regulation of state behavior could not “be tied rationally to the fulfillment 
of Congress’[s] unique obligation toward the Indians”231—in fact, the Court 
did not review it under this standard at all. Rather, the Court held that the 
Eleventh Amendment barred the federal government from abrogating state 
sovereign immunity, save for action under the Fourteenth Amendment.232 
What was facially a case about Congress’s Indian affairs power contained 
no actual analysis of either the Indian Commerce Clause or plenary power, 
instead lumping it in with the rest of Congress’s Article I powers.233 
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 227. Id. at 84. 
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III. Justice Thomas’s Critique 
In more recent years, the swinging of the federal Indian policy pendulum 
towards a policy that favors tribal sovereignty—rather than one that seeks 
to diminish it through the hammer of plenary power—has exacerbated the 
theoretical tension between the two concepts. Congress’s reliance on certain 
principles of tribal sovereignty as it sought the complete destruction of 
tribal governments raised constitutional concerns never seriously addressed 
by the Court. Similarly, recent action relying on ethereal power to restore 
prior functions of tribal sovereignty has created concerns about both the 
source and scope of the underlying power and the sincerity of Congress’s 
adherence to its claimed principles. In the modern context, however, Justice 
Clarence Thomas has initiated a full critique of the doctrine, recognizing 
the time has come to reconsider the foundations of congressional authority 
to alter the character of tribes recognized as sovereign by our government. 
A. Treaty Clause 
While Justice Thomas focuses most of his critique on the Court’s 
reliance on the Indian Commerce Clause, he does address the doubtful 
notion that the power might derive from the Treaty Clause. In Lara, Justice 
Thomas focuses his critique of the majority’s plenary power logic with its 
Treaty Clause justification.234 He notes the Lara majority’s own 
acknowledgement “that ‘[t]he treaty power does not literally authorize 
Congress to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power.’”235 Justice 
Thomas emphasizes the fact that the treaty power is a creature of Article II, 
not Article I, and so vests authority in the President “to make Treaties, 
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur[.]”236 However, to 
Congress, “it provides no power . . . at least in the absence of a specific 
treaty.”237  
While Justice Thomas acknowledges that, at times, congressional 
assertions of power might be reinforced by historical circumstances and 
effective concession by other branches, he contends that the history of 
                                                                                                                 
least some of the federal government’s Indian plenary power comes from the Treaty Clause, 
plainly a creature of Article II and not Article I. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 
(2004). 
 234. Lara, 541 U.S. at 225 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 235. Id. (quoting majority opinion, 541 U.S. at 201). 
 236. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 237. Lara, 541 U.S. at 225 (citing Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)). 
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federal Indian law does not provide such a clear picture.238 The history, he 
contends, is fundamentally at odds with itself because “[t]he Federal 
Government cannot simultaneously claim power to regulate virtually every 
aspect of the tribes through ordinary domestic legislation and also maintain 
that the tribes possess anything resembling ‘sovereignty.’”239 He concludes 
by chastising the Court for finding that the treaty power gives Congress a 
“free-floating power to legislate as it sees fit on topics that could potentially 
implicate some unspecified treaty.”240 
B. Indian Commerce Clause 
Since his concurrence in Lara, Justice Thomas has continued developing 
his critique of the modern dual-sovereignty regime, focusing on the plenary 
power doctrine and its “shak[y] foundations.”241 In Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, Justice Thomas’s concurrence addressed in depth the argument 
that the Indian Commerce Clause “provides Congress with ‘plenary power 
over Indian affairs.’”242 Thomas began by noting that the Indian Commerce 
Clause, itself merely a sub-clause of the larger Commerce Clause, draws its 
meaning from the same “[c]ommerce”243 as the larger one. This 
construction stands unless the Framers specifically intended that word to 
have a different meaning when applied to Indian tribes.244 He follows by 
noting that the phrase “commerce with Indian tribes” was, at the founding, 
synonymous with the phrase “trade with the Indians.”245 Therefore, at very 
least, Congress has no more power to regulate Indians through the Indian 
Commerce Clause than it has to regulate through the general Commerce 
Clause.246  
Justice Thomas identifies “an additional textual limitation”: that the 
Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress only “the power to regulate 
Commerce ‘with the Indian tribes.’”247 When relying on the Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 238. Id. (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. 
 241. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1968 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 242. 570 U.S. 637, 658 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1901(1) 
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Commerce Clause, Congress may only regulate commerce with tribes as 
tribes.248 The Clause does not contain language that would authorize 
congressional regulation of individual tribal members’ commercial 
conduct.249 This is especially relevant in the context of the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA).250 ICWA was passed largely as a remedial statute in 
response to “abusive child welfare practices that resulted in the separation 
of large numbers of Indian children from their families and tribes through 
adoption or foster care placement, usually in non-Indian homes.”251 In order 
to combat this wide-reaching problem, Congress elected to apply several 
provisions of ICWA to “all child custody proceedings involving an Indian 
child, regardless of whether an Indian tribe is involved.”252 Often then, the 
unit of application is not tribes, specifically within Congress’s grant under 
the Indian Commerce Clause, but rather individual Indian children.253 This 
includes Indian children who are United States citizens and residents of 
states far removed from tribal jurisdiction.254 It even covers Indian children 
without tribal members as parents.255 
Recently, Justice Thomas applied his originalist formulation of the 
Indian Commerce Clause to the IRA’s land-into-trust provisions. In Upstate 
Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. United States, Justice Thomas dissented256 
from the Court’s decision to deny a petition for a Writ of Certiorari. The 
appeal arose from the Second Circuit’s decision to allow the federal 
government to take into trust between 13,000 and 17,000 acres in upstate 
New York for the benefit of the Oneida Nation.257 In Justice Thomas’s 
view, the act of taking land into trust for an Indian tribe is not “commerce” 
within the meaning of the Indian Commerce Clause.258 Even then, assuming 
that it could be considered commerce, often enough the IRA is applied in 
ways that “do not involve trade of any kind,” as “[t]he IRA permits the 
Secretary to take into trust land that an Indian tribe already owns.”259  
                                                                                                                 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 665. 
 251. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 32 (1989). 
 252. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 665 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. 199 L. Ed. 2d 372, 372 (2017).  
 257. Upstate Citizens for Equal. v. United States, 841 F.3d 556, 564 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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As the process itself allows land taken into trust to be considered federal 
land for the purpose of state taxation and regulation, the land-into-trust 
provisions effectively allow the federal government to take swathes of land 
from states and “strip the State of almost all sovereign power over it.”260 
Taking the argument to its logical extreme, Justice Thomas argues that this 
view of plenary power gives Congress the ability to “reduce a State to near 
nonexistence by taking all land within its borders and declaring it sovereign 
Indian territory.”261 
C. Alternative View 
Justice Thomas’s approach to the Indian Commerce Clause is not 
without critiques. Professor Gregory Ablavsky has argued that Justice 
Thomas’s clause-by-clause approach to Congress’s power over Indian 
affairs misses the point.262 Ablavsky argues that the constitutional powers 
over Indian affairs emanate not only from the Indian Commerce and Treaty 
Clauses, but also from “the Supremacy Clause, the Guarantee Clause, 
Article III jurisdiction, restrictions on the states, and military powers.”263 
The interplay between these clauses was intended. The text of the 
Supremacy Clause serves as a barrier to state interference not only in 
matters of pure commerce, but also makes treaties, the primary means of 
dealing with Indian relations at the time, the supreme law of the land.264 
These treaties are then provided an enforcement mechanism through the 
judicial branch’s Article III jurisdiction.265 Likewise, the convention 
dropped the word “foreign” from the Guarantee Clause’s mandate that the 
“United States . . . shall protect each [state] against Invasion.”266 
This framework, Ablavsky argues, created an environment of effective 
field preemption in the early republic.267 Conceptualizing Congress’s Indian 
power in this manner, rather than using a clause-based approach, “makes 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Id. at 374. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Ablavsky, supra note 34, at 1040–41. 
 263. Id. at 1041. 
 264. Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1055 (2014). 
 265. Id. at 1043–44. 
 266. Id. at 1047 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4). 
 267. Ablavsky, supra note 34, at 1040; see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 398–
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government’s policy is “so pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for States to supplement 
[additional laws]” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) 
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the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 more intelligible.”268 The Act 
and its subsequent amendments “codified a hodgepodge of federal powers, 
some intended to protect the federal treaty power, others related to trade.”269 
Attempting to discover a single constitutional source authorizing the Act, 
according to Ablavsky, “asks the wrong question.”270 Instead, he argues that 
the Act is simply the federal government flexing its muscles, demonstrating 
that it has all the marbles when it comes to Indian affairs.271 Through the 
Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Act, Ablavsky contends that 
Congress reserved essentially every contemporaneously salient aspect of 
Indian policy for itself, a result “roughly analogous to present-day concepts 
of field preemption.”272 As such, more nationalistic federalists argued that 
the Constitution “prohibited the exercise of state authority” in Indian 
affairs.273 
The broad-reaching implications of Ablavsky’s theory do not stop there. 
Acknowledging that the conclusions of the nationalistic factions were not 
universally held, he argues that even the state-oriented anti-federalist 
opposition based its arguments on the structure of the Constitution, not on 
the Indian Commerce Clause or any other clause alone.274 Ablavsky uses 
the example of Georgia Congressman James Jackson’s opposition to a 
provision of the 1790 Treaty of New York, which guaranteed the Creek 
Nation title to land in Georgia.275 Jackson cited “the plainest principles of 
the Constitution, particularly those parts which secured to every citizen the 
rights of property,” as well as Article IV’s promise that “nothing in the 
Constitution would prejudice state territorial claims.”276  
Others relied on more abstract principles of state sovereignty that they 
believed were retained under the Constitution.277 The legislature of Georgia 
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itself, Ablavsky notes, justified selling the federally guaranteed land to land 
companies on its “full exercise of the jurisdiction and territorial right . . . of 
disposing thereof.”278 This right is apparently derived from the Treaty of 
Paris (evidently adopted by the Constitution), the Ex Post Facto Clause, and 
the Constitution’s guarantee of state territory.279 Ablavsky concludes by 
acknowledging that this more abstract practice of reading a general power 
from narrower, more specific grants, gave way fairly early on to the more 
clause-based approach. By the 1830s, aggressive state sovereignty 
advocates relied on narrow interpretations of the Indian Commerce Clause 
to support assertions of sovereignty over Indian nations.280 
D. Collision Course Between Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and Plenary 
Power 
Unlike other areas of Indian law, which focus primarily on statutes and 
treaties as applied or relevant to either individual or specifically enumerated 
tribes,281 the theories of inherent sovereignty and plenary power result in 
laws and precedent that apply broadly to Indian tribes as a class.282 Plenary 
power treats the federal government’s authority over tribes as uniform, 
regardless of the tribe and that tribe’s relationship with the United States. 
Inherent sovereignty, meanwhile, assumes that every tribe has given up 
precisely the same amount of its sovereignty in order to exist within the 
United States, without reference to its individual treaties or relationship 
with the United States.283 
Providing the federal government with such broad power to define what 
sovereignty means for every tribal government stretches the term “inherent” 
                                                                                                                 
the limits of the State, in the most liberal extent.’” (quoting Letter from James Hendricks to 
the Comm’rs of the United States (May 31, 1796)). 
 278. Id. (quoting Act of Jan. 7, 1795, 1795 Ga. Laws 3, § 1.) 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 1049. 
 281. See generally Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (diminishment and 
disestablishment of reservations); South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) 
(abrogation of treaty rights); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) 
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reservation). 
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 283. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 211–12 (1978) (holding that 
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to its limits. At some point, the tribe is no longer exercising its own 
sovereignty but instead what limited sovereignty the federal government 
deigns to allow. Likewise, true recognition of the sovereignty of any nation 
implies that dealings with it are maintained through the consent of the 
nation and the recognition that its internal affairs are its business. The 
plenary power doctrine does not respect tribal sovereignty and has sought 
its effective destruction since its advent.  
IV. Analysis 
Sovereignty is and always has been a fluid concept and matters of 
sovereignty are best resolved by negotiations and agreements between the 
two sovereigns. These agreements can be altered as needed by the parties, 
not by micromanagement through plenary power or by resort to the courts 
for a final answer that produces a winner and a loser. The contradictions 
intrinsic in the dueling concepts of inherent tribal sovereignty and 
congressional plenary power will eventually resolve themselves, one way or 
another. The federal government has wielded plenary power in a way that 
can often be described as arbitrary and heavy-handed. Some have been 
tempted,284 for the sake of legal sanity, to attack title 25 in its entirety and 
seek to start from scratch. However, any sincere reconciliation of federal 
Indian policy with its constitutional limitations cannot do away with title 25 
in one fell swoop.  
To that end, two results present themselves. The first, heavily implied by 
Justice Thomas, is largely mechanical. This approach begins from the 
premise that the plenary power doctrine is a power grab, not only from 
tribal governments, but also from state and local governments.285 The Act 
of 1871, although likely unenforceable as a restraint on the ability of the 
executive to negotiate and sign treaties,286 is dispositive insofar as it 
declares the opinion of Congress that tribes no longer possess an 
independent sovereignty. From here, the structure of our constitutional 
government dictates the terms. To the extent that tribes are dealt with as 
tribes, the federal government retains primary, although non-exclusive, 
jurisdiction over matters of “commerce.” State governments, as recognized 
sovereigns under the Constitution, will have concurrent jurisdiction over the 
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regulation of tribes as tribes, should they choose to regulate in that fashion, 
and exclusive jurisdiction over individual tribal members. In this scenario, 
tribes will necessarily cease to be a constitutionally relevant entity. Tribes 
will be indistinguishable from private groups or businesses for the purposes 
of their ability to regulate their members or those doing business with them. 
This is not, however, the only possible outcome. This alternative 
outcome recognizes that the end of plenary power would necessarily mean 
the rethinking of much of title 25, but it does not have to leave a vacuum. 
Depending on how Congress chooses to react, either tribal governments or 
state governments will pick up the slack. If Congress elects to recognize 
tribes as nations (requiring repeal of the Act of 1871’s prohibitions on 
treatymaking, even if the Act is likely unconstitutional), then it must 
disclaim all power over the internal affairs of tribes, essentially recognizing 
their total sovereignty. Congress can retain the status quo vis-a-vis treaties 
negotiated with individual tribes.  
Except to the extent that Congress may regulate commerce with tribes, 
Indian tribes are afforded no special or lesser status within the 
Constitution’s text.287 There is no special grant of power to either the states 
or federal government that would authorize any governmental action 
beyond what is necessary and proper to regulate commerce with the 
tribes.288 Under the Constitution, the federal government is wholly without 
the subject matter authority recognized in Kagama and Lone Wolf. In the 
absence of explicit authorization, the Constitution provides only two ways 
for the federal government to extend its subject matter grant: 1) passage of 
a constitutional amendment, or 2) ratification of a treaty, so long as neither 
the treaty nor any implementing legislation violates explicit constitutional 
prohibitions on the exercise of federal power.289  
As none of the twenty-seven amendments to the Constitution extend 
such authority, and Ablavsky himself recognizes that the penumbra 
approach to Congress’s enumerated powers fell out of vogue very early in 
the Republic,290 the only remaining sources are treaties negotiated by the 
executive and ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.291 The metes and bounds 
of tribal sovereignty and relations with the United States, for each tribe so 
recognized by the federal government, are then defined not by unilateral 
and unsupported congressional action, but by mutual agreement between 
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truly separate sovereigns, ratified by two-thirds of the states’ 
representatives.292 If this seems strange, it shouldn’t. After all, prior to 
1871, all dealings with Indian tribes were conducted by treaty. It was only 
after an act of Congress purported to remove from the executive branch the 
ability to make treaties with Indian tribes that this practice ceased; even 
then, the practice continued at least in form until Kagama and Lone Wolf. 
While the effects of the Act inform the facts that have developed since 
1871, the blatantly unconstitutional law can have no continuing force on 
executive action, if it ever had any at all. 
The consideration of tribal sovereignty and congressional authority to 
regulate tribes on an individual basis is not impracticable.293 Treaty rights 
and reservation boundaries are already litigated on a tribe-by-tribe basis.294 
While perhaps less of a perfect fit for judicial disposition than treaty rights 
or reservation boundaries, the Court already provides a framework, used 
elsewhere in federal Indian law, that could easily be applied here.  
When the Court reviews claims that Congress has diminished or 
disestablished the borders of a reservation, it follows the well-established 
framework from Solem v. Bartlett.295 First, this test looks to see if the text 
of any congressional act or treaty contains words or phrases that would 
clearly indicate that the act or treaty intended to diminish or disestablish the 
borders of a reservation.296 If the text provides no such indication, as is 
often the case because the Court did not establish what it considered to be 
the proper magic words until decades later, then the Court looks to the 
justifiable expectations of both parties.297 Unless both parties (especially the 
Indian negotiating team) clearly expected that the particular act would 
diminish or disestablish the reservation, and not that it was part of a series 
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that would eventually have that effect, then no diminishment or 
disestablishment occurred.298 
Finally, if there is conflicting evidence with at least some evidence 
pointing towards diminishment or disestablishment, then the Court may 
look to the demographic history of the reservation immediately following 
the act.299 While this step is never enough on its own to prove 
disestablishment, it can confirm what evidence from the first two steps 
might suggest.300 The Court considers this step to be “unorthodox” in the 
context of reservation boundaries. The Court applies the step only rarely, as 
diminishment or disestablishment is a purely legal matter.301 Boundaries 
cannot simply vanish by means of adverse possession or the passage of 
time.302 
Applying this framework to determine which elements of sovereignty 
have been ceded or what authority was granted to the federal government 
over time is fairly straightforward. First, courts could look to treaties signed 
by the tribes and subsequent acts of Congress based upon the relevant 
treaty. Courts determine whether any power inherent as a matter of 
sovereignty had been ceded or whether there was an explicit grant of 
authority to the United States. This step might look to questions of how the 
individual tribe exercised its sovereignty historically, before the Columbian 
encounter, where evidence is available. Where evidence is less available (as 
will often be the case), courts might look to the continuity of government. 
Courts may set a bright-line rule that if the tribal government was 
completely dissolved at any time in the last 150 years, then it is presumed 
to have lost most, if not all, of its inherent sovereignty. The burden would 
shift to the defendant or tribe to prove that Congress had given that aspect 
of sovereignty back to the tribe. 
The second step would look to the expectations of parties negotiating 
any act or treaty and if they believed that the passage of any act would 
result in the elimination of an aspect of inherent sovereignty. Historical 
evidence, while possibly sparse, can help elucidate both how individual 
tribes historically exercised sovereignty and how they altered it vis-a-vis 
their relationship with the United States. As with the diminishment and 
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disestablishment test, the critical factor in this step is whether the tribal 
negotiator firmly believed that a specific act of Congress would eliminate a 
particular aspect of tribal sovereignty.303  
The third step for this test would be more expansive than the third step in 
Solem. As sovereignty is a more fluid concept than legal borders, courts 
would look to whether, after the passage of a certain act, either a federal or 
state official began to assume a traditional tribal responsibility. The tribe 
must have either consented or relented to the result. Caution is urged in this 
step, but this is also the proper place to examine whether an aspect of tribal 
sovereignty, surrendered either under step one or step two, had ever been 
restored by a subsequent action of Congress. Behavior by tribal, state, or 
federal government following ambiguous legislation can be indicative of 
the parties’ expectations. If there is a function of government inherent in 
sovereignty that evidence shows the tribe continued to perform without 
objection from either federal or state officials, it can serve as confirmation 
that an aspect of tribal sovereignty has not been surrendered. 
V. Conclusion 
The Constitution has, since its framing, promised a government of 
enumerated powers. It removed from the regular order of government the 
means to alter its original grant, requiring supermajorities of Congress and 
sometimes the states to so act. The republic, likewise, has included distinct 
sovereigns within its borders in the form of states and Indian tribes. This is 
accounted for in the framing, providing the extraordinary measure of 
amending the Constitution to regulate the affairs of the states and the 
extraordinary measure of a treaty to regulate the behavior of tribes.  
If there are truly extraordinary situations that require an inference of 
federal power from words not present in the Constitution’s text, plenary 
power over Indian affairs is not the case. The plenary power doctrine has 
been extra-constitutional since its beginning. It serves as a stark reminder of 
a time where the Court readily altered the scope of Congress’s 
constitutional authority to meet the demands of the day. The doctrine has 
been based upon paternalistic and racist assumptions that Indian tribes are 
incapable of governing themselves, or if they are to govern themselves, 
they must assimilate completely and abandon all aspects of their culture and 
heritage. That the power has been utilized in ways beneficial to tribes does 
not save it. Federal Indian policy has almost always been shaped, at least in 
part, by those who earnestly believed that they were acting in the best 
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interests of the tribe. The policymakers behind allotment believed that 
ending tribal government and forcing the issue of individual lands would be 
beneficial for tribes.  
The end of plenary power does not and should not mean the end of tribal 
sovereignty or the federal government’s role in recognizing and managing 
relations with tribes. Congress should, nevertheless, follow the structure 
provided by the Constitution in doing so. Commerce with Indian tribes is 
properly regulated by Congress, but tribes, as individual sovereigns distinct 
from the national and state governments, should be recognized by and dealt 
with on a tribe-by-tribe basis. Binding agreements between tribes and the 
United States should be ratified by a supermajority of United States 
Senators. This was the state of affairs for nearly the first hundred years of 
the republic’s existence, during times where the tribal-federal relationship 
was anything but friendly. This is not a simple process, but the fact that the 
Constitution makes the creation of national policy more difficult is no 
excuse to invent new federal powers based upon foundations of sand. 
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